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The Federal Question in Patent-License Cases
AMELIA SMITH RINEHART*
The patent law has long recognized a patent owner’s ability to license some
interest in the patent by granting to others permission to tread upon the patent
owner’s property rights without legal consequence. When one of the parties to a
patent license decides to seek remedies from the other party for a license harm, the
resulting litigation may be a patent-infringement case with a contract issue or a
contract case with a patent issue. In most cases, the patent owner brings her suit
against the licensee in federal court, alleging that the licensee breached the license
contract and, as a result, now infringes the patent. However, a patent owner, as the
master of her suit, may choose to bring it in state court and raise only a contract
claim governed by state law. The license agreement, by its very nature, implicates
patent issues, but it is not always clear when a state suit like this one may be
removed to federal court. This is especially true after a recent Supreme Court case,
Gunn v. Minton, and amendments to the relevant jurisdictional statutes as part of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011.
The jurisdictional rules governing these types of cases are convoluted, clunky,
and heavily criticized. In this Article, I argue that the current jurisdictional rules
are unnecessary and burdensome in patent-license cases, and I propose a new rule
that would place patent-license cases—even those that would be considered state
contract cases under the existing framework—in federal courts with exclusive
appeals to the Federal Circuit. Ultimately, the reduced burden on litigants and
courts, the increased clarity of the law, and the structural advantages for the
Federal Circuit as it continues to develop an important body of licensing law
outweigh any federalism costs.
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INTRODUCTION
In a patent license, a patent owner grants to someone else permission to tread
upon the patent owner’s property rights without legal consequence.1 Although these
licenses seem like ordinary contracts, hidden behind the basic agreement granting
permission to make, use, sell, or otherwise practice the patented invention lurks a
murky gumbo of contract, property, antitrust, and patent laws and policies. Because
licenses have important economic consequences for licensors, licensees, and the
general public,2 they often end up the center of patent disputes. In fact, since 2007,
the Supreme Court has heard five cases in which a patent license was essential to
the Court’s resolution of the dispute.3 This is not surprising—patent licensing has
long been considered “a critical transaction model in the information economy.”4
A patent-license dispute may involve a little (or a lot) of state contract law and
federal patent law. Federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases that arise under the laws relating to patents.5 Likewise, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases that arise under the patent laws.6 Therefore, when courts are asked to determine
whether a patent-license case belongs in federal court on patent-law grounds,

1. See Potter v. Holland, 19 F. Cas. 1154, 1157 (C.C.D. Conn. 1858) (No. 11,329) (“A
licensee is one who has transferred to him, in writing or orally, a less or different interest
than either the interest in the whole patent, or an undivided part of such whole interest, or an
exclusive sectional interest.”); see also 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 760 (1890) (“The conveyance of the subordinate rights in the
invention, either separately or united, without affecting the monopoly otherwise than by
estoppel, is also permitted; and the interests thus created are fully vindicated and sustained.
To this conveyance custom and judicial sanction have attached the name of License.”). The
precursor for the U.S. patent laws, the 1474 Venetian Act, also recognizes licenses in its text.
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature
and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204 (2009) (citing Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents
(1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948)).
2. XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE 14–
39 (2006) (describing the value of licensing as its ability to enable innovation); see also Robert
P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005).
3. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
4. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 1, at 203. As Richard Epstein writes, “These multiple
transactions help wring the last unit of value out of the underlying [intellectual property]
asset.” Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 498 (2010).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). For one proposal that this statute should not provide for
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014
WIS. L. REV. 11.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). The previous versions of § 1295 tied the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to cases that arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. See infra Part I.B
for further discussion of the relevance of this amendment.
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choosing the right answer implicates not just the choice between state and federal
courts but also the choice between a regional appeal and a specialized-court appeal.7
Two recent Supreme Court cases, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.8 and
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC,9 involved disputes over
whether patent-license cases belong in federal court at all. In these cases and others,
complex questions of federal patent jurisdiction—what one scholar referred to as
“one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and federal
jurisdiction”10—complicate what may be a relatively simple inquiry on the merits.
This Article suggests that this dark corridor instead should be an easy, well-lighted
path, best positioning the Federal Circuit to develop a robust body of licensing law.
A case arises under the laws relating to patents when either (1) the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint includes a patent-law cause of action or (2) the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint includes a nonpatent cause of action that raises a necessary,
disputed, and substantial patent question whose resolution in federal court would
not disrupt the proper federal-state balance.11 The first category of cases includes
claims for patent infringement and for correction of inventorship of an issued

7. This choice has been particularly salient in recent years, as the Federal Circuit and
its jurisprudence have come under a sustained attack from the Supreme Court, the legal
academy, practitioners, and even other appellate judges. The Supreme Court has rejected
several Federal Circuit patent-law doctrines in recent years, including its machine-ortransformation test as the sole test for determining patent-eligible business methods, Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); its “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for determining
Article III standing in declaratory judgment actions, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118; its
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test to combine requirements for nonobviousness, KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); and its presumption of irreparable harm for
patent-infringement winners, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). For
criticism from patent scholars, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2003) (stating that in some technology fields the
Federal Circuit fails to realize that its patent-law policy is “precisely backwards”); Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1797
(2013) (providing an account of the Federal Circuit’s “power enhancement”); Craig Allen
Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1619, 1621 (2007). The Honorable Diane Wood, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, recently advocated abolishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit,
suggesting instead that giving parties a choice between the Federal Circuit and the regional
circuit in which their claim was first filed is a way to address the “blurred lines” that occur
between patent law and the other types of intellectual property law handled by regional
circuits. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address, Is It Time To Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 6 (citing ROBIN
THICKE, Blurred Lines, on BLURRED LINES (Star Trak / Interscope 2013)).
8. 549 U.S. 118.
9. 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
10. Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 639, 662–64 (1971) (assessing the
jurisdictional effects of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)); see also Arthur Young &
Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990).
11. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013). This test for federal patent
jurisdiction parallels that of the general federal-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1988).
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patent, the only patent causes of action.12 The second category of cases, which the
Supreme Court has called “a special and small category,”13 comprises federal
causes of action that are not specific to patents (e.g., antitrust claims)14 or state
causes of action (e.g., contract claims).15 To further confuse matters, a patent
question raised as a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, or one raised in
anticipation of a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, cannot support federal
patent jurisdiction.16 This prohibition makes declaratory-judgment cases like the
ones often brought by patent licensees against patent owners (including
MedImmune and Medtronic) even more complex, jurisdiction-wise. As the
Supreme Court developed these complex jurisdictional rules in both patent and
general federal-question cases, it emphasized how special and small the second
category of federal cases is. For example, the Court refused federal patent
jurisdiction over a patent legal-malpractice case in Gunn v. Minton.17
Alongside this line of precedent, the Supreme Court also has been promoting
federal patent policy over state-law interests, effectively broadening jurisdiction to
accommodate licensee challenges, which it deems important to a strong public
interest in policing bad patents.18 Congress, too, has stepped into the fray,
amending the jurisdictional statutes in 2011.19 As a result, lower courts struggle to

12. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”); 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) (“[A] court . . . may order correction of the
[inventorship of the] patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned . . . .”). Courts
accept § 281 as creating a cause of action. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit has construed § 256 to “provide[] a cause
of action to interested parties to have the inventorship of a patent changed to reflect the true
inventors of the subject matter claimed in the patent.” Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123
F.3d 1466, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
13. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)).
14. See, e.g., Christianson, 486 U.S. at 805 (antitrust).
15. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1282–85
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the second path to federal patent jurisdiction and holding the
contract claim did not require resolution of a patent-law question), appeal transferred, 410 F.
App’x 151 (10th Cir. 2011); see also U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (holding that breach-of-contract claim arose under the patent laws because the
claim required a court to interpret the patents and determine whether the accused product
infringed those patents).
16. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809.
17. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066–68.
18. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (“[E]nforcing this contractual
provision would undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in
the public domain.”); see also Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.
1943) (“We have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper that it
should not remain in the art as a scarecrow.”).
19. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), expanded the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction to include compulsory counterclaims like the ones raised and rejected
by the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826 (2002). See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the
Federal Circuit over an appeal from a final decision “in any civil action arising under, or in
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define the outer boundaries of jurisdiction over cases involving a patent license that
implicates both patent-law and contract-law questions.20 The resulting jurisdictional
map, complete with state-federal border disputes, gives rise to too much spilled ink
from courts and expended resources by parties, even if the parties concede
jurisdiction one way or another.21
In this Article, I argue that the current jurisdictional rules are unnecessary and
burdensome in patent-license cases, and I propose a new rule placing patent-license
cases—even those that under the existing framework would be considered state
contract cases—in federal courts with exclusive appeals to the Federal Circuit. Part
I explains the current law of statutory jurisdiction in patent-license cases, including
declaratory-judgment cases brought by parties other than the patent owner. Part II
appraises the current jurisdictional rules as inefficient for both litigants and courts.
Part III makes the case for a clear, bright-line rule, treating patent-license cases as
special, mixed-law cases worthy of streamlined and uniform treatment. In this Part,
I illustrate the impact of the new rule and consider the potential disadvantages of
such a rule, including objections grounded in federalism concerns. Ultimately, the
reduced burden on litigants and courts, the increased clarity of law, and the
structural advantages of the Federal Circuit to develop an important body of
licensing law outweigh any federalism costs. Finally, the Article concludes with
some thoughts on the impact and importance of federal patent jurisdiction.
I. CASES ARISING UNDER LAWS RELATING TO PATENTS
In addition to constitutional justiciability governed by the Article III “cases and
controversies” requirement,22 federal cases must satisfy a statutory requirement:
specifically, Congress must have conferred subject-matter jurisdiction over the
dispute.23 In patent cases, the statutory grant of jurisdiction comes from 28 U.S.C.
any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any
Act of Congress relating to patents”). The legislation also added a removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1454 (2012), for patent, plant-variety protection, and copyright cases. See AIA § 19(c)(1).
20. See, e.g., Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 775 (Ct. App.
2004) (acknowledging “the difficulties inherent in deciding such questions”).
21. “Subject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even
where, as here, neither party has raised this issue.” Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Textile Prods., Inc., v. Mead
Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1485–86 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a
special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review,’ even though the parties are prepared to concede it.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
(1986)))
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 277–83 (6th ed. 2012).
The two most common statutory grants of jurisdiction are diversity jurisdiction, where
Congress allows cases involving diverse parties to be adjudicated in federal courts regardless
of the nature of the claims at issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), and federal-question
jurisdiction, where Congress allows cases involving certain claims to be adjudicated in
federal courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). The existence of federal jurisdiction is not
controversial. However, rationales for its existence, such as lack of parity in state courts or
the need for uniformity in the interpretation of the law, have been disputed. See
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§ 1338(a), which follows closely the general federal-question jurisdiction grant in
28 U.S.C. § 1331.24 Part I.A describes how courts determine federal patent
jurisdiction under § 1338(a). Part I.B explains the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. Finally, Part I.C briefly discusses how state
license actions may be removed to federal court as federal patent cases.
A. Federal Patent Jurisdiction
The patent-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), provides for original and
exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents.” 25 In 2011, Congress added, for emphasis, “No State court shall
have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents.”26 Courts interpreting § 1338 utilize the wealth of jurisprudence
interpreting the general federal-question statute, which also uses “arising under” to
define its grant of federal jurisdiction to certain cases, because the two statutes have
long been linked in interpretation through “linguistic consistency.”27

CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 5.2.1, at 283–84. With regard to parity, see Erwin Chemerinksy,
Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233
(1988). With regard to uniformity, see John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247 (2007) (arguing that there is reason to
doubt that uniformity of federal law will be undermined by permitting state courts to
adjudicate federal claims).
24. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (“Our
cases interpreting identical language in other jurisdictional provisions, particularly the
general federal-question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . have quite naturally applied the
same test.”).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). An early patent law, the Patent Act of 1793, granted
jurisdiction to infringement suits brought “in the circuit court of the United States, or any
other court having competent jurisdiction.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322
(repealed 1836). The Patent Act of 1836 provided that all actions arising under the patent
laws shall be originally cognizable in the circuit courts. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5
Stat. 117, 124 (amended 1870). In 1870, Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts over cases arising under the patent laws. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 55–58, 16
Stat. 198, 206–07; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 256, 36 Stat. 1087, 1160; 28
U.S.C. § 371 (1925–26); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. II 1948); Note, The Jurisdiction of State
Courts over Cases Involving Patents, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 461 n.1 (1931).
26. AIA, Pub. L. No. 212-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (2012)). The Supreme Court recently stated, “For cases falling within the patent-specific
arising under jurisdiction of § 1338(a), however, Congress has not only provided for federal
jurisdiction but also eliminated state jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013).
27. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09. It is not enough to anticipate a patent-law defense
in the complaint. Id. at 809. Rather, patent law must create the cause of action or comprise a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 808–09; see also Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066–
68; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (finding no Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction based on § 1338(a) when the
underlying case was brought under the diversity statute), appeal transferred, 410 F. App’x
151 (10th Cir. 2011); infra Part III (suggesting that § 1338(a) be uncoupled from the
interpretation and legacy of § 1331).

2014]

THE FEDERAL QUESTION IN PATENT-LICENSE CASES

7

In patent cases, as in general ones, the Supreme Court recognizes two ways that
a case arises under federal law.28 The more direct way is “when federal law creates
the cause of action asserted.”29 This category of cases “accounts for the vast bulk of
suits that arise under federal law”30 and captured courts’ first understanding of the
jurisdictional statute now known as § 1338(a).
In cases brought in the early twentieth century, when the patent owner sued an
alleged infringer for patent infringement and requested relief in the form of an
injunction or damages, the case arose under the patent laws even if the plaintiff and
the defendant were in a contractual relationship.31 In other words, if the patent
owner licensed the patent, he still could sue the licensee for patent infringement
even though the contract dictated what the licensee had permission to do.32
However, as the Court noted in Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
[W]here a patentee complainant makes his suit one for recovery of
royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for damages for a
breach of its covenants, or for a specific performance thereof, or asks
the aid of the Court in declaring a forfeiture of the license or in
restoring an unclouded title to the patent, he does not give the federal
district court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under the patent
laws.33
The exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over patents as provided by § 1338
required courts to distinguish those cases that arise under the patent laws from
those cases “in which a patent may be the subject-matter of the controversy.”34

28. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65; Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g
& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005).
29. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (citing Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).
30. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)).
31. See, e.g., Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 260 (1897).
32. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135–36 (2007). Of course,
the license may be raised as a defense to the action, which goes to the merits, not the
jurisdiction, of the case. Id.
33. 270 U.S. 496, 510 (1926). In Luckett, the patent owner sued his licensees, alleging
breach of contract and infringement by manufacture of the licensed products after breach;
the owner requested relief in the form of payment of royalties, reassignment of the patent
back to the inventor, and specific performance of the contracts in general. Id. at 500–02. It
appeared that infringement was an afterthought for the plaintiff. Id. at 511 (“[T]he bill in this
case, as we have already fully pointed out, is really not based on threatened infringement but
on the contracts; and its reference to infringements is inadequate . . . to present a bill . . . .”).
34. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1912). In
New Marshall Engine Co., the plaintiff patent owner requested specific performance of an
agreement to assign an improvement on a patent. Id. at 479. In Wilson v. Sandford, the Court
had declined jurisdiction when the patent owner sued to establish forfeiture of a license and
requested an injunction against infringement should the forfeiture be established. 51 U.S. (10
How.) 99, 101 (1850). Chief Justice Taney wrote,
Now the dispute in this case does not arise under any act of Congress; nor does
the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to patents. It
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The Court decided these earlier cases before it developed the second, less direct
path for jurisdiction, what it refers to as “a ‘special and small category’ of cases.”35
“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.”36 Unfortunately, no bright-line rule guides a court37—it must determine
whether the case involves “not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one,
indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be
inherent in a federal forum.”38
Addressing whether patent-license cases fall into this special and small category,
the Federal Circuit has held that “issues of inventorship, infringement, validity and
enforceability present sufficiently substantial questions of federal patent law to

arises out of the contract stated in the bill; and there is no act of Congress
providing for or regulating contracts of this kind.
Id. at 101–02. In contrast, in Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., the Court found federal
jurisdiction when the plaintiff pleaded patent infringement and alleged breach and
termination of a license in anticipation of the licensee’s defenses to the charge of
infringement. 237 U.S. 479 (1915). Likewise, in The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., the
Court found jurisdiction when “the plaintiff sued upon the patent law, so far as the purport
and intent of the bill [was] concerned. . . . [I]t charged an infringement of its patent rights in
general terms . . . which it could have done only by virtue of the statute.” 228 U.S. 22, 24
(1913). The Fair’s patent owner sold devices to a distributor with a retail price restriction,
and the distributor sold the devices to purchasers with notice of the restriction. Id. at 23–24.
That same Term, the Supreme Court held that resale price restrictions like these are invalid
and not enforceable as a matter of patent law. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16–17
(1913) (reasoning that such restrictions are “beyond the protection and purpose of the [Patent
A]ct”); see also Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 496 (2010). Conditional sales and license restrictions,
however, may be enforceable in both contract law and patent law, which raises the
jurisdictional question of whether the case arises under the patent laws.
35. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). “[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005).
36. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
37. Grable, 545 U.S. at 317. In his concurrence in Grable, Justice Thomas states that
“[j]urisdictional rules should be clear” and indicates his own preference for the bright-line
rule in American Well Works (in an opinion from Justice Holmes) where only federal causes
of action arise under federal law. Id. at 321 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas offers
that the Smith framework, adopted by Grable, “may not be worth the effort it entails.” Id. In
Gunn, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “In outlining the contours of this slim category, we do
not paint on a blank canvas. Unfortunately, the canvas looks like one that Jackson Pollock
got to first.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
38. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. The Court “has resisted all attempts to frame a single,
precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the
original jurisdiction of the district courts.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
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support jurisdiction under § 1338(a).”39 In these cases, some of which are described
below, the court asks whether the contractual rights and duties disputed in the state
action implicate one of these substantial patent issues relating to the licensee’s
privilege to operate without liability under the patent claims. If so, the court holds
that the case arises under the laws relating to patents.
Of the four issues listed, the most obvious of these is infringement, which is the
basis of the patent cause of action found in 35 U.S.C. § 281.40 For example, the
Federal Circuit in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray held that a question of patent
infringement, when necessary for resolution of a state contract action, raised a
substantial question of federal patent law sufficient to carry jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a).41 The breach-of-contract action in U.S. Valves required a determination
of whether the license covered the products sold by the defendant or whether those
products fell outside of it.42 This in turn required a determination of which products
the patent-in-suit covered.43 Interestingly, the court did not need to resolve the
question of patent law to make the determination of breach (a contractual question);
rather, the question of what products the license covered related only to the
measure of damages for the prevailing plaintiff.44
Likewise, in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit found Federal
Circuit appellate jurisdiction over a case involving a patent owner’s suit against a
licensee for failure to pay royalties under a patent license.45 The license involved an

39. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d 1358,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”).
41. 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Further, in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic
Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus.,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and Additive Controls &
Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the Federal Circuit
confirmed that patent infringement also raises a substantial question of patent law when it is
an element of a plaintiff’s state tort claim. Cf. ClearPlay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding no jurisdiction over a case involving six various state-law
counts, because even though it was possible that patent infringement could arise during the
course of the litigation, no count necessarily required resolution of a patent-law issue).
42. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372.
43. Id.; see also Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction over a contract case where the plaintiff alleging breach would
have to prove infringement to obtain relief).
44. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1374–75; see also Portney v. CIBA Vision Corp., 401 F.
App’x 526, 528–29 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (retaining jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract action
where the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant’s products fell within the scope
of the patent claims).
45. 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) appeal transferred, 178 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (unpublished decision). The Fifth Circuit first held that it, not the Federal Circuit, had
jurisdiction over the question of whether the district court in that case had federal patent
jurisdiction, stating:
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enhanced royalty provision that required the court to determine whether the
licensee acquired a new company pursuant to the license terms, whether the new
company offered the licensed services prior to the acquisition, and whether the new
company was immune from suit or had a license to the patents-in-suit.46 The Fifth
Circuit held that these questions could only be answered by determining a
substantial question of patent law, namely, whether the services provided fell
within the claims of the licensed patent.47
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
presented a very similar case: a breach-of-contract action involving a question of
whether the patent-in-suit covered certain products.48 However, in Metabolite, the
question of patent infringement (or scope of the license) had been resolved in a
previous litigation between the parties that would serve as res judicata in the case.49
The Federal Circuit refused jurisdiction over the case, holding that the patent
owner’s breach-of-contract action would “not require resolution of a disputed
question of patent law central to the disposition of the breach of contract claim.”50
Because the patent infringement question had already been determined, it did not
need to be resolved by the Metabolite court.51
In addition to questions of infringement, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged
that questions of invalidity and unenforceability of the patent are also substantial in
the context of § 1338. For example, in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design,
Inc., the court stated,
In keeping with our precedent, we treat validity and enforceability the
same as infringement. We see no reason why our jurisdictional
jurisprudence should distinguish the first two from the latter. Each of
these issues is substantial in the federal scheme, for they are essential to
the federally created property right: one determines whether there is a
property right, another whether that right is enforceable, and the third
what is the scope of that right.
In deciding that the issues of validity and enforceability are substantial
enough, we also look to the purposes that Congress intended to promote
by forming this court. In enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
We decline to read section 1295 as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
Federal Circuit over issues of the propriety of a district court’s jurisdiction
under section 1338. Such an interpretation conflicts with the inherent principles
that a regional circuit court can determine its own jurisdiction and supervise the
exercise of jurisdiction by the district courts within its circuit.
Id.
46. Id. at 289–90.
47. Id. at 291. The Federal Circuit also confers jurisdiction where the patent question in
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint concerns not hypothetical infringement but simply
how the claims of the patent-in-suit should be construed. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright
& Jaworski LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“As a determination of patent
infringement serves as the basis of § 1338 jurisdiction over related state law claims, so does
a determination of claim scope. After all, claim scope determination is the first step of a
patent infringement analysis.”).
48. 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010), appeal transferred, 410 F. App’x 151 (10th Cir. 2011).
49. Id. at 1283.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1286.
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1982, which created this court, Congress made manifest its intent to
effect “a clear, stable, uniform basis for evaluating matters of patent
validity/invalidity and infringement/noninfringement,” so as to “render[]
more predictable the outcome of contemplated litigation, facilitate[]
effective business planning, and add[] confidence to investment in
innovative new products and technology.” To achieve those goals, we
conclude . . . that validity and enforceability represent federal interests of
great stake over which, when the other requirements of section 1338(a)
are satisfied, we should exert our appellate jurisdiction under section
1295(a)(1) via section 1338(a) jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise would
undermine Congress’s expectations for this court.52
What are “the other requirements of section 1338(a)”?53 Presumably, the Federal
Circuit intended that a question of patent validity or unenforceability could support
federal patent jurisdiction, but the question must also be necessarily raised, actually
disputed, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the important
state-federal balance.54 As with the question of infringement (i.e., the scope of the
patent to cover licensed products), a question of invalidity or unenforceability gives
rise to federal patent jurisdiction under § 1338 in the Federal Circuit when the
question must be answered to establish the contractual rights and duties found in
the agreement.55
The Supreme Court also links “arising-under” jurisdiction (whether federal
question or patent) with what it refers to as the well-pleaded complaint rule, a
coarse filter for jurisdiction that aspires to separate federal claims from federal
issues.56 The Court first formulated the rule in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
v. Mottley:57
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only
when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it
is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and
asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the
Constitution of the United States.58
Following Mottley, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that a
plaintiff cannot establish federal jurisdiction simply by raising or anticipating a
federal defense—the plaintiff’s complaint must present a federal question on its

52. 153 F.3d 1318, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
53. Id. at 1331.
54. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013).
55. See Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d
1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and
Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (describing the well-pleaded
complaint rule as an analytical filter to be used as a first step in an “arising under” analysis).
57. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
58. Id. at 152.
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face.59 By corollary, a defendant cannot convert a nonfederal case into a federal one
simply by asserting a federal defense or counterclaim.60 The plaintiff, as master of
his suit, determines whether his case arises under federal law.61
In modern cases, the Supreme Court continues to place the arising-under inquiry
solely within the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint: federal-question jurisdiction
extends to the two Grable categories,62 and then “only [to] those cases in which a
well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.”63 This rigidity has been criticized over the
years,64 but it remains an essential element of federal arising-under jurisdiction of
all flavors.65 As a result, when a plaintiff does not plead a federal cause of action,
courts must determine from that plaintiff’s complaint the importance of the federal
question to the case at hand; courts must further decline jurisdiction over federal
questions that arise in defense to or in anticipation of the defendant’s defenses or
counterclaims.66 Moreover, when the plaintiff brings a claim for relief supported by
multiple theories, the claim does not arise under federal law unless the federal

59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, § 5.2.3, at 294–95.
60. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). In
patent cases, the addition of 28 U.S.C. § 1454 and the amendment to § 1295 abrogates
Holmes Group in the context of compulsory patent counterclaims. See Joe Matal, A Guide to
the Legislative History of the America Invents Act (pt. 2), 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 539, 539–41
(2012); see also supra note 19.
61. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). As Justice Holmes
explained,
[T]he party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon
and therefore does determine whether he will bring a “suit arising under” the
patent or other law of the United States by his declaration or bill. That
question cannot depend upon the answer, and accordingly jurisdiction cannot
be conferred by the defence even when anticipated and replied to in the bill.
Conversely, when the plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an act of
Congress jurisdiction cannot be defeated by a plea denying the merits of the
claim.
Id. (citation omitted). As one scholar notes, “[I]f a party alleges a federal substantive right in
good faith, jurisdiction exists no matter how wrong he is on the merits.” Herman L.
Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445,
462 (1954).
62. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) (describing federal-question jurisdiction as invoked most frequently by plaintiffs who
plead a cause of action created by federal law and less frequently by those who plead “statelaw claims that implicate significant federal issues”).
63. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953).
65. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4 (reaffirming the rule despite describing it as based
more on “history than logic”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, §5.2.3, at 301.
66. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9–11.
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question is essential to each of the theories presented by the plaintiff in support of
her claim for relief.67
Restating the well-pleaded complaint rule as applied to § 1338(a), the Supreme
Court instructed that patent defenses raised by a defendant in his answer do not
supply federal patent jurisdiction to the suit, even if those defenses oblige the court to
interpret the validity of a patent or to resolve other patent issues.68 In other words,
§ 1338(a) requires that the plaintiff’s cause of action carry the substantial patent
question necessary for federal jurisdiction and for Federal Circuit appellate review.69
Two relatively modern cases further explain the operation of the well-pleaded
complaint rule in patent cases, both addressing the rule indirectly through the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.70 In Christianson, the
plaintiff alleged federal antitrust liability and state trade-secret theft giving rise to
tortious interference with business relations, where the state claim required proof
that the defendant’s patent-law accusations were false.71 The court held that the
case did not arise under the patent laws because patent law was not an essential
element of each of the plaintiff’s multiple theories for relief in his case.72

67. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988). In
Christianson, the court distinguished between theories and claims, allowing jurisdiction only
if the claim is based solely on theories involving questions of federal law.
68. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Justice
Holmes wrote, “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action. The fact that the
justification may involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the
question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract.” Id.
Coincidentally (or perhaps not), Justice Holmes wrote the opinions in American Well Works
(denying jurisdiction over business tort), The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22, 25 (1913) (recognizing that a defendant may not force a case to come within federal
patent jurisdiction), and Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915) (granting
jurisdiction where patent owner claimed patent infringement).
69. See Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260. In American Well Works, the plaintiff brought
a state suit for libel and injury to its business, claiming that the patent owner falsely and
maliciously accused it of infringing its patents. The defendant removed the case to federal
court, alleging that the patent laws gave the case federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff
would have to prove that he was not infringing the patent in order to establish his state law
claim of libel. The Court disagreed that federal jurisdiction existed, holding that “[a] suit for
damages to business caused by a threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under
the patent law.” Id. at 259.
70. The Federal Circuit receives exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases from
28 U.S.C. § 1295. See infra Part I.B.
71. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 800. Because the district court established federal
jurisdiction through diversity and the Sherman Act, the Federal Circuit initially refused to
hear the appeal due to a lack of § 1338 jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Seventh
Circuit. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (citing an unpublished Federal Circuit order), vacated, 486 U.S. 800. The Seventh
Circuit, in turn, transferred the case back to the Federal Circuit. Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit then agreed to weigh in
on the merits in the “interest of justice.” Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1559–60. The Supreme
Court later vacated this Federal Circuit decision. Christianson, 486 U.S. 800.
72. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 812–13 (distinguishing between a patent theory and a
patent claim and holding that only patent claims give rise to federal jurisdiction under
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Similarly, in Holmes Group, the declaratory plaintiff brought a claim for a
declaration of noninfringement of trade dress under the Lanham Act, and the
declaratory defendant (a patent owner) counterclaimed for patent infringement
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 281.73 The Court held that the well-pleaded complaint rule
prevented the case from arising under the patent laws because the patent counterclaim
was not part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.74 As a result, the well-pleaded
complaint rule blocks federal patent jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff does
not facially plead an essential question of patent law—either a federal patent cause of
action or a cause of action that raises a necessary, substantial, disputed, and important
federal patent question—as part of her case or controversy.75
One final rule applies when a party (usually an alleged infringer or licensee)
opts to file a suit against the patent owner to request anticipatory declaratory relief.
Because the mechanism for doing so does not confer federal jurisdiction,76 the
declaratory plaintiff must demonstrate that § 1338(a) confers federal patent
jurisdiction.
Because either party to a controversy may request declaratory relief, declaratory
cases typically fall into two categories: (1) cases in which the plaintiff could bring
her own coercive action (referred to here as alternative-relief cases), and (2) cases
in which the plaintiff has no coercive action of her own (referred to here as mirrorimage cases).77 In the former category, the plaintiff could bring her own coercive
action, but she seeks declaratory relief in addition to or instead of the coercive
relief she has the right to seek.78 For example, a patent owner may file suit for
patent infringement against an alleged infringer and include claims requesting a
declaratory judgment that the patent is infringed. The court may decline to award
damages or an injunction and yet still grant the declaration, which the patent
owner may use in the future as res judicata against the alleged infringer.79 A
§ 1338). For an analysis of how the Federal Circuit interprets federal-state and federalfederal cause-of-action conflicts, see John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v.
Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal
Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1899–901 (1996).
73. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). For a
discussion of Holmes Group and its impact on Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, see
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012)
(granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over an appeal from a final decision
“in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a
compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents”).
74. Holmes Grp., 535 U.S. at 832–34; see also Cotropia, supra note 56, at 16–17.
75. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005).
76. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 138 (2007) (“[T]his Court
has held that ‘the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.’” (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937))).
77. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, at xi (2d ed. 1941).
78. The Declaratory Judgments Act expressly authorizes a plaintiff with a right to
coercive relief to request declaratory relief without joining a claim for coercive relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
79. Declaratory judgments granted under § 2201 are considered final judgments and
have the same preclusive effect as corresponding coercive judgments. 18A CHARLES ALAN
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patent owner may even choose solely to request declaratory relief from the
court.80
In the latter category of declaratory cases, mirror-image cases, the declaratory
plaintiff has no cause of action or legal right to coercive relief of her own.81 For
example, an alleged patent infringer may file suit against the patent owner, requesting
only declaratory relief in the form of a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. The
alleged infringer has no affirmative right of her own to cancel the patent by bringing a
coercive action against the patent owner or the government.82
In both types of declaratory cases, a declaratory plaintiff embroiled in an otherwise
justiciable controversy may have difficulty establishing federal patent jurisdiction
under the well-pleaded complaint rule. In mirror-image cases, a declaratory plaintiff
may plead anticipatory federal patent defenses to her adversary’s coercive cause of
action (which may not be a federal patent question).83 In alternative-relief cases, a
declaratory plaintiff without her own patent cause of action may plead patent questions
in anticipation of her adversary’s defenses or counterclaims. When considering the
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to declaratory patent cases, the Supreme
Court has had to reconcile the anticipatory character of the declaratory proceeding
with the formalistic well-pleaded complaint rule, which forbids anticipatory patent
pleading (a difficult reconciliation, to be sure).84
Federal patent jurisdiction, even in declaratory cases, turns on whether the
declaratory plaintiff’s complaint, on its face, presents a federal patent question
“unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is
thought the defendant may interpose.”85 The Declaratory Judgments Act’s
allowance for relief “necessary or proper” against the adverse party necessitates a
request for the “present declaration of [a] right or immunity,” not something to hold
in one’s pocket for potential use in later judicial proceedings (i.e., the prohibited

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4446 (2d ed. 2002) (“The very purpose of this remedy is to establish a binding adjudication
that enables the parties to enjoy the benefits of reliance and repose secured by res judicata.”).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
81. These cases had no remedy in federal courts prior to passage of the Declaratory
Judgments Act in 1934. BORCHARD, supra note 77, at 806. Indeed, the Act itself sprang from
recognition of the social and economic advantages in making relief available to these
plaintiffs despite the lack of any cognizable wrong in law or equity. See id. at 804–05.
82. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871) (“It would seriously impair the value of
the title which the government grants after regular proceedings before officers appointed for
the purpose, if the validity of the instrument by which the grant is made, can be impeached
by any one whose interest may be affected by it, and would tend to discredit the authority of
the government in such matters.”); see also United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224
(1897) (limiting government invalidity challenges to cases of fraud or deceit); Enka B. V. v.
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Del. 1981) (saying that the
“admirable” policies supporting the Act “do not, however, constitute the courts as roving
inquirers into patent validity”). More recently, the government has been allowed to challenge
patents on antitrust grounds. See United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
83. BORCHARD, supra note 77, at 804–05.
84. See Frank M. Gilliland, Jr., Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830–32 (1951).
85. Id. at 834 (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950)).

16

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1

hypothetical case).86 How does a court determine whether a declaratory plaintiff
has raised a federal patent question? The Supreme Court emphasizes the
impropriety of a declaratory plaintiff seeking to establish a federal defense against
a coercive state cause of action that the declaratory defendant might bring in the
future.87 The character of the threatened action (the cause of action that the
declaratory plaintiff anticipates from the declaratory defendant) must be the
touchstone for federal jurisdiction in declaratory cases, not the character of the
declaratory plaintiff’s anticipated defense.88
Most recently, the Court in Medtronic reiterated that the proper jurisdictional
inquiry in patent declaratory judgment cases with respect to the well-pleaded
complaint rule relates to “the nature of the threatened action in the absence of the
declaratory judgment suit.”89 The Medtronic licensee believed that it owed no
royalties because its products did not infringe the licensed patent.90 According to
the Court, if the licensee had acted on that belief, the patent owner could terminate
the license and bring an action for patent infringement in federal court.91 As such,
the Court wrote, “this declaratory judgment action, which avoids that threatened
action, also ‘arises under’ federal patent law.”92
In sum, a case arises under the patent laws when a plaintiff’s well-pleaded
complaint claims a patent cause of action or when other nonpatent claims raise a
necessary, disputed, and substantial patent question whose resolution in federal court
does not disrupt the proper federal-state balance.93 There is no exclusive federal

86. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 245 (1952).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 248 (“If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to
assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may
entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is
dubious even though the declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if that right
is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action.”). Justice Reed,
concurring in the judgment, argued that the controversy was “clear and definite,” but he
would have declined jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. Id. at 250–251 (Reed, J.,
concurring). Because the Declaratory Judgment Act “exists as an instrument to protect the
citizen against the dangers and damages that may result from his erroneous belief as to his
rights under state or federal law,” courts seeking to provide this relatively new alternative
form of relief should “appraise the threatened injuries to complainant, the necessity and
danger of his acting at his peril through incurring heavy damages, [and] the adequacy of state
or other remedies.” Id. In Wycoff, Justice Reed identified no unusual danger of loss or
damage. Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the declaratory plaintiff had both a
justiciable controversy and federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 on the facts. Douglas
criticized the majority’s failure to exercise jurisdiction as “relegat[ing] the declaratory
judgment to a low estate.” Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Medtronic, Inc. v.
Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
89. Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 848.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14
(2005) (“[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue,
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jurisdiction over questions arising under the patent laws, only over cases arising
under the patent laws.94 Some cases involving patent questions that do not qualify as
patent cases may find their way to federal courts sitting in diversity, but the Federal
Circuit will not have appellate jurisdiction over these appeals.95 Other cases involving
patent questions may remain in state courts, which is not without precedent.96
B. Federal Circuit Appellate Jurisdiction
In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and gave it appellate jurisdiction
over patent-case appeals from the district courts and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).97 The Federal Circuit initially obtained exclusive
jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this
title.”98 Therefore, the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit also required
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule, as underscored by the Holmes
Group case.99 Any case brought in federal district court under § 1338 gave rise to
appellate jurisdiction within the Federal Circuit.100 In cases like Christianson and
Holmes Group, the jurisdictional question surrounding application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule was one and the same with those relevant to a § 1338
analysis.101
In 2011, Congress amended § 1295 to remove the direct reference to § 1338,
replacing it with a grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “an appeal from a
final decision of a district court . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil
action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any
Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.”102 This amendment
was intended to abrogate Holmes Group by allowing for appellate jurisdiction
when a defendant’s counterclaim carries the federal patent question, rather than
looking solely to the plaintiff’s complaint.103
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”).
94. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
96. Historically, state courts have determined questions involving the scope, validity, or
infringement of a patent when such determinations are necessary to decide the case before
them. See Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1975); Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton
Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1970).
97. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
99. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)
(rejecting § 1295 and § 1338 jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim for patent
infringement pleaded by the defendant); see supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 70–75.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(1) (2012).
103. The 2011 amendments not only extend jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over civil
actions in which compulsory counterclaims arise under the patent laws but also provide for
removal by any party who brings a claim arising under the patent laws. See AIA, Pub. L. No.
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C. Removal of State Patent Cases to Federal Court
A case originally filed in state court can be removed to federal court if the case
could have been brought in federal court to begin with.104 Until 2011, patent cases
filed in state court could be removed to federal court only through the general
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).105 Section 1441(a) allows for removal by a
defendant of “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction.”106 This provision does not alter the
arising-under jurisprudence governing whether the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction over the civil action that the defendant seeks to
remove.107 The state plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must meet the Grable twocategory test by presenting either a federal claim for relief or a state claim for relief
that raises a necessarily raised, actually disputed, and substantial issue whose
resolution in federal court would not disrupt the federal-state balance struck by
Congress.108 To be removed to federal court with a right of appeal to the Federal
Circuit, the federal issue or claim for relief must necessarily be one arising under
the laws relating to patents in accordance with § 1338.109
The AIA added a new patent-specific removal section to enable its reversal of
Holmes Group.110 The new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1454, governs removal in all cases
arising under the patent laws.111 In contrast to § 1441, patent litigants on either side
of the case (“any party”) are given the opportunity to remove the case to federal
court based on any claims or counterclaims that relate to patent laws.112 In the few
cases that have ruled on this provision since its enactment, the courts have held, in
dicta, that the provision also would be subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule,

112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 17 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 109–407, at 5 (2006); Matal, supra
note 60, at 539–41. Note, the new language mimics that of § 1338 purposefully—suggesting
that “the principles of the well-pleaded complaint that determine the district court’s jurisdiction
also determine appellate jurisdiction.” Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 968–69 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 n.2 (1988)).
104. See 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (2012); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1982) (holding that case was not within the removal jurisdiction of
§ 1441 because it did not fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts); see also
Uroplasty, Inc. v. Advanced Uroscience, Inc., 239 F.3d 1277, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A case
may only be removed from state to federal court if it originally could have been brought in
federal court.”).
105. In 2011, Congress added a new removal statute applicable to patent cases,
transferring patent removals from § 1441 to new § 1454. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §
19(c), 125 Stat. 284, 332 (2011); Univ. of Ky. Research Found., Inc. v. Niadyne, Inc., Civ.
No. 13–16–GFVT, 2013 WL 5943921, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing legislative
changes made by the AIA with respect to patent-case removal).
106. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a).
107. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987).
108. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
110. See supra note 103.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (2012).
112. Id.
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albeit applied in a manner consistent with allowing either party’s claims for relief
to support removal.113
II. TRAVELING THE DARK CORRIDOR OF PATENT JURISDICTION
When a patent owner enters into a license agreement, the resulting agreement
represents an arm’s-length negotiation between the patent owner and his licensee,
complete with rights and duties enforceable through contract law. The license
agreement also grants permission to the licensee to practice the patented invention,
a privilege nullifying the patent owner’s right to exclude others. If a dispute arises
between the parties, the patent owner may sue the licensee for relief in contract or
patent law.114 If the patent owner decides to pursue only his contract claims, the
licensee may raise an affirmative defense of patent noninfringement or invalidity,
occasionally in the form of a counterclaim for declaratory relief. The licensee also
can sue the patent owner for relief in contract law and can bring his own
declaratory action in patent law. Accordingly, the universe of cases that might arise
looks like this:
(1)

The patent owner sues the licensee for patent relief in federal court.

(2)

The licensee sues the patent owner for declaratory relief in federal
court.

(3)

The patent owner sues the licensee for contract relief in federal court
and the parties are diverse.

(4)

The patent owner sues the licensee (or the licensee sues the patent
owner) for contract relief in state court.

In category one, the case arises under the laws relating to patents. Because the
cause of action concerns patent law, proper jurisdiction lies in federal court with a
right of appeal to the Federal Circuit.115 In category two, the Supreme Court has
effectively determined that the case arises under the patent laws (at least when the

113. The cases applying § 1454 have not ruled on the question of patent claims but on the
question of timely filing for removal. See, e.g., Univ. of Ky. Research Found., Inc. v.
Niadyne, Inc., Civ. No. 13–16–GFVT, 2013 WL 5943921, at *6, *10 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5,
2013) (holding that the state-court defendant did not timely remove the action to federal
court in accordance with procedural rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
114. Chisum, supra note 10, at 646; DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, §
21.01[1][a][v] (describing the patent owner’s decision as a “pleader’s choice”). This does not
preclude supplemental claims sounding in contract law, which the patent owner may be able
to bring based on the particular details of the license at issue. See, e.g, Sims v. Western Steel
Co., 403 F. Supp. 450. 453 (D. Utah 1975) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction over a state
contract claim based upon a substantial federal patent infringement claim derived from the
same operative facts).
115. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988);
Kunkel v. Topmaster Int’l, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695–96 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (granting jurisdiction
over a suit where the patent owner alleged infringement without authority and requested
remedies under 35 U.S.C. § 284, because “[t]hat is all [the patent owner] needed to do to
invoke federal jurisdiction”).
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license has a termination clause for nonpayment of royalties).116 In category three,
the question of arising-under jurisdiction governs whether the case is appealed to
the Federal Circuit or a regional appellate court.117 In category four, the question of
arising-under jurisdiction governs whether the case can be removed to federal court
and then appealed to the Federal Circuit.118 Categories three and four (both
involving state-law claims for relief) pose the same question: because the cause of
action is not grounded in patent law, does the case fit into the small category of
cases defined by the Grable two-part test, raising an issue of patent law that is
necessary, in dispute, substantial, and resolvable in federal court without disrupting
the federal-state balance approved by Congress?119
As described in Part I, post-Christianson and post-Grable, the Federal Circuit
has approached its jurisdiction (and all patent arising-under jurisdiction) over
license cases in these state-claim categories with some degree of formalism—does
the case at hand raise a question of infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or
unenforceability?120 The question of infringement arises in license cases if the
license ties contractual rights and duties to only those products or services that
would otherwise infringe the patent or if the claims of the patent require
interpretation in order to determine the rights and duties under the contract.121 The
questions of invalidity and unenforceability arise if the license ties contractual
rights and duties only to those patents that are valid or neither invalidated nor
declared unenforceable prior to the termination of the license.122 By taking
jurisdiction over these four patent issues that can arise in state suits, the Federal

116. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014).

117

See, e.g., Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., 767 F.3d 1334 (2014), where the
Federal Circuit noted that “ ‘[a]lthough this case arises from a contract claim, rather
than directly as a patent infringement claim, Jang’s right to relief on the contract
claim as asserted in the complaint depends on an issue of federal patent law. . .’
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn alters that conclusion.” Id. at
1336.
118

See, e.g., Uroplasty, 239 F.3d at 1279 (applying § 1441 for removal
jurisdiction). As described above, the AIA added § 1454 to allow either party to
remove the case to federal court based on any claims or counterclaims that relate to
the patent laws. See Part II.C. supra.
119. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013).
120. Since Gunn, which took a narrow view of what cases arise under the laws of patents
in accordance with § 1338, the Federal Circuit has not reviewed a patent-license case with a
jurisdictional question.
121. See, e.g., Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329, 331 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
122. See, e.g., Natec, Inc. v. Deter Co., 28 F.3d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1994) (transferring an
appeal to the Federal Circuit after determining that the plaintiff’s state contract claim
required a determination of whether his license was enforceable after the patent expired).
The question of inventorship often arises over ownership disputes; such disputes are not the
focus of this Article.
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Circuit has concluded that the need for uniformity in patent law justifies elevating
some state claims to the federal courts and to its own appellate jurisdiction.123
Despite this laudable attempt to craft a well-defined rule for federal patent
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit’s approach appears to conflict directly with the
Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Gunn, resulting in several problems: (1)
inconsistency among the various courts considering these issues; (2) inefficiency
produced by each court’s obligation to satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction, which
increases the litigation time and expense for both litigants and courts; and (3)
uncertainty following Gunn. Each problem will be addressed in turn.
A. Inconsistency Among Courts
The complex layers of rules for determining whether a case arises under the laws
relating to patents (including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gunn) leave
litigants vulnerable to inconsistent rulings from the various courts making
jurisdictional decisions. As discussed in Part I, the Federal Circuit has developed a
formal heuristic for making the determination—asking whether the state claim at issue
involves a patent question of infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or
unenforceability. However, the Federal Circuit need only apply its own heuristic when
it assures itself of its own jurisdiction over the case; other courts are free to develop
their own rules to assure themselves of their own jurisdiction over license cases.124
Even before Gunn called into question the Federal Circuit’s rule of thumb, other
courts hearing similar disputes decided the jurisdictional question in different ways.
In U.S. Valves, the Federal Circuit held that an accounting for which products the
patent claims covered—a question of infringement—caused the case to arise under
the patent laws.125 In contrast, in Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC, a
California state court of appeals heard a license case involving a determination of
both claim scope and validity, keeping jurisdiction in its own state court.126 As in
U.S. Valves, the Applera patent owner filed a breach-of-contract suit against its
licensee, alleging that the licensee did not pay royalties or supply mandatory
royalty reports as required by the license agreement.127 The Applera agreement
required the licensee to pay royalties on products identified by certain patented
processes and features.128 The defendant-licensee challenged the state court’s
jurisdiction, arguing that the patent owner’s contract claim required a resolution of

123. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330–31 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.,
175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Hunter Douglas, the Federal Circuit stated that in order to
achieve Congress’s goals of clarity, stability, and uniformity on questions of invalidity and
infringement, it must exert jurisdiction over cases involving patent validity and
enforceability because they “represent federal interests of great stake.” Id. at 1331.
124. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“This court has
inherent jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” (citing United States v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947)).
125. 212 F.3d at 1372.
126. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Ct. App. 2009).
127. Id. at 186.
128. Id. at 189.
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substantial questions of patent law (i.e., determining whether the products sold
were licensed products and whether the underlying patents were invalid).129
Considering Christianson, the California court held that neither of these potential
patent issues supported federal patent jurisdiction because the patent owner was
required to prove neither for his breach-of-contract claim.130 According to the
patent owner’s complaint, the court reasoned, the breach might merely involve a
“failure to pay royalties concurrently with the submission of a royalty report in
which defendant acknowledges the sale of products covered by the license.”131 The
court continued,
“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule . . . focuses on claims, not theories,
and just because an element that is essential to a particular theory might
be governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire . . .
claim ‘arises under’ patent law.” Although it is true patent law issues
conceivably could still arise in such an action—the parties might
disagree as to the categorization of certain products—relief would not
necessarily depend on the resolution of such issues.132
Turning to the second potential patent issue, patent invalidity, the California
court rightfully noted that a licensee could raise patent invalidity as an affirmative
defense to an allegation of nonpayment of royalties, but the court also observed that
a patent invalidity question cannot create federal jurisdiction in this context.133 The
particular agreement at issue required royalty payments for products covered by a
“Valid Claim,” defined as “the claim of a patent or pending patent application
which has not been held invalid or otherwise unenforceable by a court from which
no appeal has or can be taken, or has not otherwise finally been held unpatentable
by the appropriate administrative agency.”134 According to the court, this
contractual language provided only the opportunity for the licensee to “plead and
prove patent invalidity as a defense.”135 The court reasoned that a patent’s
presumption of validity sets the bargaining table for the licensee and the patent
owner alike; it read the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins to
“endorse[] challenges to patent validity by licensees” but also concluded that state
contract law “does not require a licensor to prove patent validity as an element of a
claim for licensing royalties in the first instance.”136 In fact, the Applera court

129. Id.
130. Id. at 191.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 191–92 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 811 (1988)).
133. Id. at 192.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675–76 (1969). Note, Medtronic calls
into question the reasoning in Applera vis-à-vis the presumption of validity, but there the
Court focuses on the specific terms of the license agreement. See Medtronic, Inc. v.
Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014) (“The patent licensing
agreement specifies that, if Medtronic stops paying royalties, Mirowski can terminate the
contract and bring an ordinary patent infringement action.”).
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explicitly rejected the reasoning of U.S. Valves.137 These types of inconsistent
decisions are troubling for litigants, because they invite forum shopping by the
patent owner eager to remain in state court to protect the validity of his patent. The
licensee may file a declaratory action in a federal court of his choosing, but this
adds considerably to the expense of litigating the patent’s validity and may result in
inconsistent verdicts between the federal court hearing the patent case and the state
court hearing the contract one.
B. Inefficiency for Litigants and Courts
In addition to inconsistency among courts, the current framework also
demonstrates procedural inefficiencies. Christianson, the most cited § 1338 case
decided by the Supreme Court, provides an excellent example.138 The case
originated as a federal antitrust claim filed by a former employee of the patent
owner in federal court under the general federal-question statute.139 The patent
owner appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which, after full briefing and argument, concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring the appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit,
however, raising the jurisdictional issue sua sponte, concluded that the
Federal Circuit was “clearly wrong” and transferred the case back. The
Federal Circuit, for its part, adhered to its prior jurisdictional ruling,
concluding that the Seventh Circuit exhibited “a monumental
misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted this court,” and was
“clearly wrong.” Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to address
the merits in the “interest of justice,” and reversed the District Court.
We granted certiorari, and now vacate the judgment of the Federal
Circuit.140
Such transfers between appellate circuits can be common. For example, in Jim
Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded “albeit
reluctantly, that neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction over the
[contract] causes of action pled by plaintiffs.”141 Jim Arnold originated as a case filed
by a patent assignee in state court for a number of contract-related claims and a claim
of patent infringement based upon rescission of his assignment agreement to the
defendants.142 The defendants removed the case to federal court, where they received
summary judgment on the merits, and the patent assignee appealed to the Fifth
Circuit.143 The Fifth Circuit transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit, which held
that jurisdiction was lacking under § 1338(a), but in so doing described its reluctance:

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Applera, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 190–92.
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
Id. at 804.
Id. at 806–07 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
109 F.3d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1569–70.
Id. at 1570–71.
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[J]udicial economy would suggest that plaintiff has had his day in court
with regard to an initial determination of his claims at the trial level, and
that the correctness of that determination is now a matter of appellate
review of its merits. . . . [T]hough the result of a trial in state court may
replicate the result reached by the federal district court, considerations of
judicial economy cannot trump a clear rule of law, particularly one that
goes to the very power of the court to decide the case.144
Similarly, U.S. Valves originated as a state contract claim filed by the patent
owner in federal court through diversity of the parties.145 The licensee lost the
contract case in an Indiana federal district court and appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit transferred the case to the Federal Circuit
after concluding that one element of the contract claim—whether the defendant
breached the contract—could only be resolved by determining whether the patent
claims covered the products sold by the licensee.146 Because the Federal Circuit had
to assure itself that jurisdiction was proper, it again assessed the case under the
arising-under law and determined, again, that the case did arise under the patent laws
because patent law was a necessary element of the patent owner’s contract claim.147
Because subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised by a court (district or appellate)
sua sponte if neither party raises the issue, these types of cases are disposed to create
multiple hearings on the subject of jurisdiction in different courts.148
C. Uncertainty After Gunn v. Minton
Separately from disagreements by other courts, the Federal Circuit’s own
framework now seems uncertain in light of Gunn v. Minton.149 In Gunn, the
Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence of patent arising-under
jurisdiction in the context of a patent-attorney malpractice claim.150 In the Federal
Circuit’s patent-malpractice cases, including the oft-cited Air Measurement
Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.151 and Immunocept,

144. Id. at 1572.
145. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1999), appeal transferred,
212 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 812–15.
147. 212 F.3d at 1372.
148. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1988)
(Not every case must result “in a perpetual game of jurisdictional ping-pong until this Court
intervenes to resolve the underlying jurisdictional dispute, or (more likely) until one of the
parties surrenders to futility. Such a state of affairs would undermine public confidence in
our judiciary, squander private and public resources, and commit far too much of this
Court’s calendar to the resolution of fact-specific jurisdictional disputes that lack national
importance.”); Portney v. CIBA Vision Corp., 401 Fed. App’x. 526 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding
its jurisdiction proper over a suit brought in federal court under the diversity statute after the
Ninth Circuit transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit).
149. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
150. Id. at 1063, 1066, 1068.
151. 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP,152 the Federal Circuit held that the “case within
a case” nature of a malpractice claim often dictates substantial underlying questions
of patent law that confer jurisdiction under § 1338⎯namely, questions of
infringement, inventorship, invalidity, or unenforceability.153 The legal formalism
of the Federal Circuit’s arising-under framework—focusing on the specific
questions presented in the case, not on the surrounding context of a backwardlooking analysis—was particularly apparent in these malpractice cases.154
The Gunn Court interpreted the Federal Circuit’s formalism as a departure from
the more extensive Grable analysis and reversed. The Gunn Court explained,
[W]e are comfortable concluding that state legal malpractice claims
based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under
federal patent law for purposes of § 1338(a). Although such cases may
necessarily raise disputed questions of patent law, those cases are by
their nature unlikely to have the sort of significance for the federal
system necessary to establish jurisdiction.155
Accordingly, the final determination of the Grable test requires that the patent
question be significant to the federal system as a whole, not just to the “particular
parties in the immediate suit.”156 Such “‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ effects
are not sufficient to establish arising under jurisdiction.”157
Following Gunn, at least one appellate court applied this stringent and limited
view of arising-under patent jurisdiction to a license case. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. held that
a contract case did not arise under the patent laws even when the plaintiff had to
prove patent infringement to succeed on his breach-of-contract claim.158 According
to the court, the question of patent infringement was necessarily raised and actually
disputed, but it was not substantial, and granting patent jurisdiction to the case
would upset the “congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.”159 As discussed above in Part I, this approach represents a
departure from pre-Gunn Federal Circuit law, and it remains to be seen whether
other appellate or state courts will follow suit.

152. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
153. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, 676 F.3d 1354, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (malpractice claim required the court
to define the scope of the patent claims, supporting jurisdiction under § 1338); Air
Measurement Techs., 504 F.3d at 1268–69 (malpractice claim required the court to decide
hypothetical patent infringement “case within the case,” supporting jurisdiction under § 1338).
154. See supra note 153; see also John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003) (recounting a recent trend in the Federal Circuit towards
formalism and discussing implications for several areas of patent policy).
155. 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
156. Id. at 1066.
157. Id. at 1068 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
677, 701 (2006)).
158. 720 F.3d 833, 841−42 (11th Cir. 2013).
159. Id. at 841 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
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The Federal Circuit has addressed the Gunn decision only in the context of a
state tort claim. In Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator
Technologies, Inc., the court evaluated its jurisdiction over a case involving claims
of tortious false statements by the defendant as to whether the patents were
infringed or invalid.160 In pre-Gunn cases, the Federal Circuit entertained
jurisdiction over tort claims involving questions of infringement or invalidity
because “permitting state courts to adjudicate disparagement cases (involving
alleged false statements about U.S. patent rights) could result in inconsistent
judgments between state and federal courts.”161 The Forrester case, however,
presented a different set of facts. The allegedly false statements were made about
activity that took place in Taiwan, activity that could not infringe U.S. patents.162
Moreover, the court referred to the necessary construction of the claims of the
patent (as a matter of law) as “‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ . . . [and] not
sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction.”163 Thus, the Federal
Circuit held that these questions were “not ‘substantial in the relevant sense,’”
under Gunn’s formulation, to arise under the patent laws, even though claim
construction—previously sufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 1338(a)—was
required to resolve the contract claim.164
So far, this Part has focused on the state contract claim raised by the patent
owner (either in a state court or in a federal court sitting in diversity), which may
arise under § 1338 in its own right, per Grable’s second category for substantial
patent questions. When a licensee pleads the question of patent invalidity as an
affirmative defense, the well-pleaded complaint rule should prevent that federal
defense from arising under Grable’s first category, thereby ensuring the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint dictates jurisdiction.165 When a licensee pleads, instead, a
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or noninfringement,
the well-pleaded complaint rule shifts to an inquiry about the threatened action that
the plaintiff could have brought.166 Although the patent owner (acting as “master”
of his suit)167chooses a state court as his forum to seek contract relief, declaratory
counterclaims pleaded by a licensee in a state-court case should have the same
result jurisdiction-wise as if the licensee filed the declaratory claim in federal court

160. 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
161. Id. at 1334.
162. Id. at 1334–35. The patentee’s right to exclude others does not extend to activity
conducted outside of the United States and its territories. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).
163. Forrester Envtl. Servs., 715 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059,
1067–68 (2013)).
164. Id. at 1336 (quoting Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066).
165. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“[I]t is now settled
law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense
. . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties
concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” (emphasis in original)).
166. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (suggesting that
district courts must look to the threatened coercive cause of action to determine whether
federal-question jurisdiction exists over a declaratory plaintiff’s claim).
167. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); see also supra note 61.
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in the first instance. In both scenarios, under the new statutory amendments and
removal statute, the counterclaim itself would look to the relevant threatened
coercive action, and the hypothetical patent-infringement action (however remote)
would carry the day.168 This should ensure that the patent owner cannot remain in
state court; licensees likely will remove these cases by pleading
declaratory-judgment counterclaims that would satisfy § 1454’s well-pleaded
complaint rule.169 Because Congress added § 1454 in 2011, it remains to be seen
whether this scintilla of certainty will hold true in patent-license cases.
III. A WELL-LIGHTED PATH FOR FEDERAL LICENSING LAW
The preceding Parts of this Article describe the complex and confusing legal
rules governing the questions of federal and appellate jurisdiction in cases that arise
under the laws relating to patents. These Parts further suggest some problems with
the current rules, including inconsistency, inefficiency, and uncertainty. In this final
Part, I offer a broad suggestion for clarifying the existing law to achieve a number
of goals, including to promote greater uniformity among licensing decisions in
federal courts, to capitalize on the benefits of a specialized appellate court, and,
importantly, to simplify unnecessarily complex rules.
A. Federal Circuit Formalism Revisited
As may be apparent, a patent-license case brought in state court balances the
right of the patent owner (as the master of his suit) to choose his preferred forum
and to litigate any contract claims separately, without exposing the patent to a
validity challenge in federal court, against the oft-stated public-policy interest in
encouraging patent challenges generally.170 The balance should be struck in favor
of the public interest in having these issues resolved in federal court and appealed
to the Federal Circuit and in having them resolved at minimal cost.

168. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 772 (describing the licensee’s continued payment of
royalties as making an imminent threat of an infringement suit “at least remote, if not nonexistent.”)
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012) (allowing for removal of counterclaims with original
federal jurisdiction).
170. This tension and consequential balancing of interests is not unlike the balancing of
interests considered by the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
See also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344–45 (1971)
(abrogating the mutuality of obligation principle to encourage patent challenges because of
the patent grant’s tie to the public interest). This tension manifests itself in the recent circuit
split over the enforceability of no-challenge clauses in patent licenses (clauses whereby the
licensee agrees to not challenge the validity of the licensed patent). See Dylan Pittman,
Allowing Patent Validity Challenges Despite No-Challenge Clauses: Fulfilling the Will of
King Lear, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 339, 362 (2014) (proposing that the split be resolved in favor of
unenforceability on the same public policy grounds announced in Lear). Compare Rates
Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding such clauses
unenforceable) to Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444
F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971).
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As Justice Clarence Thomas has stated, “Jurisdictional rules should be clear.”171
To that end, the Federal Circuit’s long-suffering formalism,172 with a small
adjustment, works here. Specifically, one way to solve these jurisdictional
problems in patent-license cases would be to have all of them arise under the patent
laws—a clear, bright-line rule that removes the inconsistency, inefficiency, and
uncertainty inherent in the present set of rules. When a patent owner files a state
contract action against a licensee, alleging breach of the license or raising other
contract claims, instead of conducting the extensive and expensive analysis under
§ 1338(a) and § 1295, the state court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
if the patent owner’s contract claim involves any patent-law question, including
patent infringement (and questions involving the scope of the patent’s claims or
any field-of-use restrictions therein), invalidity, unenforceability, and inventorship.
If a party attempts to remove the case under § 1454, the federal court to which it is
removed should accept jurisdiction, again without the extensive and expensive
analysis described throughout this Article as being required by Supreme Court
precedent and § 1338(a). Finally, if a state contract case involving any of these
same embedded patent questions is brought to federal court by diverse parties, the
case should be appealed to the Federal Circuit as a case arising under the patent
laws. This would leave in state court only those claims involving a patent license
that are truly contractual—cases disputing patent ownership (not related to
inventorship) and cases in which infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability
questions have been conceded or otherwise previously resolved by the parties.
How does this neoformalist proposal fit within the current jurisprudence relating
to patent law arising-under jurisdiction? Courts simply need to recognize that
patent licenses are engines for innovation; patent licenses create value from patents
in ways that patent owners cannot without the ability to grant permission to others
in exchange for rents.173 If courts recognize a patent license as a special kind of
contract that not only involves contractual rights and obligations but also involves
an exchange related to the property interest of the patent (the right to exclude others
from practicing the claimed invention), the difficulty our current system encounters
trying to unravel what is and what is not a contract claim falls away. If the case
includes any embedded patent questions, the case is a patent one. Federal courts
and the Federal Circuit are perfectly well suited to resolve contractual issues
accompanying the property concerns associated with the patent or patents-in-suit,
more so than state courts are suited to resolve patent issues accompanying state
contract claims. If courts value certainty, efficiency, and consistency in
jurisdictional rules, the optimal solution for patent-license cases must be to have
them all arise under the patent laws, to have them heard in federal courts, and to
have them appealed to the Federal Circuit.

171. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
172. See Thomas, supra note 154.
173. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–14.
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The Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn cases suggest that this proposal is consistent
with § 1338’s arising-under language.174 The questions of infringement and claim
construction that arise in almost all license cases should elevate these cases to
federal status on those grounds alone, even if the court adheres to the limited
analysis of Grable.175 Cases like U.S. Valves, in doubt after Gunn, represent the
high watermark of patent jurisdiction to which courts should return. The Federal
Circuit should confer its own appellate jurisdiction over those cases in which the
scope of the patent is relevant to the contractual case for interpreting the license and
determining the relief to be granted.
Even in cases like MDS (Canada), where the only patent question involves
claim construction of the licensed patent,176 courts should confer federal patent
jurisdiction. The question of claim construction, and its role in patent litigation, has
been heavily debated for many years.177 The Federal Circuit has concluded that
claim construction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.178 As a result,
district-court claim constructions undergo frequent reversals, a fact that has led to
empirical and theoretical work suggesting optimal approaches to solving the
inherent problem of the indeterminacy of language.179 Ascertaining the correct
approach to claim construction, as a question of law or otherwise, is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, the debate about claim construction and its role
within all patent litigations indicates that when interpretation of a license requires
claim construction, that dispute involves a necessary, actually disputed, substantial,
and relevant question of patent law, which arises under § 1338(a) and travels on
appeal to the Federal Circuit under § 1295. Because claim construction is part of an

174. See, e.g., Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App’x 329, 331 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Additive
Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
175. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–14.
176. MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013).
177. For a recent summary of the debate, see Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530 (2013). Chiang
and Solum thoughtfully argue that the problem lies not with linguistic indeterminacy, as
others have suggested, but with judges’ beliefs regarding the policy goals of claim
construction itself. Id. at 534.
178. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[W]e are not persuaded that discarding de novo review would
produce a better or more reliable or more accurate or more just determination of patent claim
scope.” (emphasis in original)), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1536 (U.S. June 20, 2014).
The Supreme Court recently granted a petition for certiorari to consider whether claim
construction should be reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014) (No.
13-854). When a court defines a patent’s claims in a claim-construction order, it sets the
legal boundary of the patent itself, which, in turn, determines questions of infringement and
invalidity. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he
claims measure the invention.”).
179. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2001) (empirically evaluating the question of claim
construction within the district courts and the Federal Circuit and concluding that “the
present system of adjudication is flawed”).
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infringement analysis, determining whether any given licensed good or service falls
within the claims of the patent should likewise give rise to jurisdiction in both
federal courts and the Federal Circuit. To hold otherwise, as the Eleventh Circuit
did in MDS (Canada),180 implies that claim construction is a pure question of fact,
which the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.181 It would further uniformity of
claim construction methods to allow patent-license cases into federal court and to
have the claims construed as a matter of law.
For questions of invalidity, the obstacle to federal jurisdiction has been whether
the plaintiff’s cause of action required determination of the validity of the patentin-suit’s claims, in light of the fact that patents are presumed valid by statute.182
Challengers overcome this presumption by proving with clear-and-convincing
evidence that the patent is invalid or unenforceable, in either a contract case or a
patent one.183 The California Court of Appeals assumed in Applera Corp. v. MP
Biomedicals, LLC, that the presumption of validity adhering to patents for
evidentiary reasons should preclude federal patent jurisdiction solely because a
patent owner or licensor need not prove, as part of his contract case, that the patent
is valid.184 It would follow from this reasoning that only licenses with terms
defining the patent privilege of the license relative to the validity of the claims
should proceed in federal court. However, this view of invalidity as only
occasionally elevating a license case to one arising under the patent laws leaves
much to be desired with respect to consistency, efficiency, and certainty.185
Further, the modern Supreme Court has steadfastly encouraged challenges to
patents by licensees. In Lear, Inc. v. Atkins, the Court explicitly promoted federal
patent policy over state contract policies that prevented licensees from raising the
invalidity of a patent as a defense to a state contract claim.186 In Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Court recognized the
importance of having final judgments made by federal courts to invalidate patent
claims by holding that these judgments carry preclusive effect forward in rem.187
Thirty years later, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. opened a door to federal
court that had previously been closed to those post-Lear licensees who lacked
constitutional justiciability over their declaratory suits in the Federal Circuit when
challenging patents without terminating, repudiating, or breaching their licenses.188
Finally, this past Term, the Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures,
LLC addressed the remaining question of statutory jurisdiction for licensees in good
standing in the affirmative, approving of arising-under federal patent jurisdiction

180. MDS (Canada), 720 F.3d at 841–42.
181. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996) (describing
claim construction as a “mongrel practice”); see also Teva Pharm., 723 F.3d at 1373
(reaffirming that claim construction is a matter of law).
182. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
183. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2252 (2011).
184. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 178, 191–92 (Ct. App. 2009).
185. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).
186. See id. at 670–71.
187. See 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
188. 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).
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for those cases by imagining a hypothetical threatened coercive action for patent
infringement, even when the licensee remains privileged by the license.189
These developments suggest that the Court approves of having these cases in
federal court, not for the traditionally proffered reasons—uniformity of patent law,
the expertise of federal courts compared to state ones, and the like190—but because
federal patent jurisdiction rewards licensees who put the patent’s validity in issue
with resolution in rem. The Court’s different take on patent legal-malpractice
cases—where it emphasizes the important state interests at play and the role of
federalism in navigating this divide191—provides a stark contrast to its preference
for jurisdiction in patent-license cases.192 When the Federal Circuit assumed
jurisdiction in patent legal-malpractice cases, the “case within the case” involved
questions of infringement, invalidity, unenforceability, and inventorship, the same
four questions it identified as critical in any analysis under § 1338(a).193 The
Supreme Court, however, corrected the Federal Circuit, choosing state law over
such backward-looking patent questions.194 Importantly, patent-license cases do not
implicate the case within the case, and they may be treated differently. For
pragmatic reasons, it is sound to confer jurisdiction over any patent-license claim
when the claim, contract or otherwise, inherently implicates questions of claim
scope and patent invalidity, even if the license does not explicitly tie its rights and
duties to these questions.
A myopic focus on explicit license terms (ostensibly taken from Christianson
and revisited in MedImmune and Medtronic) would approve of federal patent
jurisdiction through § 1338(a) only over those state contract cases in which the
contract includes a term tying the rights and duties under the agreement to only
valid patent claims or those patent claims that have not been invalidated by a
court.195 It follows that the best drafting practices (or worst ones) will dictate
jurisdictional questions under this rubric. Although the Court in Lear held that
patent invalidity comprised not a failure of consideration for the contract itself but a
complete defense to any obligations under the contract (including an obligation to
pay royalties),196 the validity of the patent always will be relevant to whether the
licensee has breached his obligations. The licensee will carry the burden of proving

189. 134 S. Ct. 843, 848–49 (2014) (supporting federal jurisdiction over a purely
hypothetical, threatened coercive action for infringement).
190. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 17–27. Gugliuzza discusses the general assumption
underlying exclusive federal jurisdiction in patent cases—that federal courts, unlike state
courts, provide uniformity and expertise in patent law—and concludes that the uniformityexpertise rationale is overstated. See id. at 55.
191. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013).
192. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130–31.
193. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
194. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65.
195. The license agreement at issue in MedImmune, for example, featured both types of
contract terms. 549 U.S. at 122–24.
196. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59–60 (7th Cir.
1970) (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)).
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invalidity by clear-and-convincing evidence, but courts could assume, for
jurisdictional purposes, that patent-license cases implicate the question of invalidity
as though it were an element of the plaintiff’s claim. This would mean that all
license claims would carry this important question of patent law. The ability to
invalidate a patent in rem in a federal court after it has issued plays an important
role in the federal patent system.197 Perhaps the time has come to stop referring to
invalidity as a defense to infringement or breach of license and nothing more.198
Congressional intent also supports federal patent jurisdiction over all patentlicense cases implicitly or explicitly raising patent questions of infringement,
inventorship, invalidity, and unenforceability. As discussed in Part I, Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and § 1295 specifically to abrogate by statute the
ruling in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., which held
that the well-pleaded complaint rule prevented a counterclaim of patent
infringement from conferring federal patent jurisdiction.199 The change to § 1338(a)
was not subtle—“No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”200⎯arguably demonstrating
a clear intent to bring all of these cases to federal court, leaving no state court with
jurisdiction over patent questions.201 The amendment also suggests that an
otherwise removable state contract case could not stay in state court for resolution
of the state contract claim with its embedded patent issues.202 To avoid this thorny
situation of a case without a home in any court, federal courts should assume
jurisdiction over license cases that raise any patent issues, in order to realize the
clear congressional intent to have all patent-related cases in federal courts and
appealable to the Federal Circuit.204
Building on Congress’ intent to treat patent cases differently (for better or
worse), a more radical proposal would uncouple 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) from § 1331

197. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 350 (holding that a patentee cannot assert
validity of a patent that previously has been found invalid in a federal court against a
different defendant).
198. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2012); MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 142 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Patent invalidity is an affirmative defense to patent infringement, not a
freestanding cause of action.”).
199. See supra note 19.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
201. See Paul M. Schoenhard, Gaps, Conflicts and Ambiguities in the Federal Courts’
Post-AIA Patent Jurisdiction, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2013, at 20 (describing the
amendment to § 1338 as “leav[ing] a glaring jurisdictional gap).
202

The “jurisdictional gap” created by § 1338, in combination with the new
removal statute in § 1454, suggests that such cases, i.e. license cases brought in
state court on contract claims with embedded patent issues, must be removed by
either party or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
204. By superseding Holmes Group to expand removal jurisdiction and arising-under
jurisdiction to encompass counterclaims (like those requesting a declaratory judgment of
invalidity), Congress most recently expressed its intent to further “the uniformity or
coherence in patent law that has been steadily building since the [Federal] Circuit’s creation
in 1982.” Matal, supra note 60, at 540 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 5 (2006)).
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such that arising-under jurisdiction for patent cases would no longer be bound to
the Grable line of cases. The general federal-question statute in § 1331 was
designed to create a category of federal cases that is neither too big nor too small
and, as Grable teaches, that does not disrupt the important balance between federal
and state interests.205 Grable, then, attempts to solve a different problem than the
one presented by patent-license cases. For patent cases, Congress chose a specialty
appeals court and granted exclusive and original jurisdiction in the federal district
courts.206 Section 1331, in contrast, grants original, not exclusive, jurisdiction to
general federal questions, and these cases are appealable to regional, generalist
courts of appeals. The decision of whether to hear the case in federal court or in
state court involves a delicate balancing of state and federal interests of a classic
federalist vein. Patent cases, on the other hand, with exclusivity in federal courts,
have always tipped the scales in favor of federal courts, especially given
Congress’s recent statutory amendments allowing for removal of counterclaims
despite the well-pleaded complaint rule.207 Additionally, uncoupling § 1338(a)
from § 1331 and its analysis would allow for abandoning the well-pleaded
complaint rule in its entirety in patent cases. Indeed, when it recognized a purely
hypothetical coercive claim of patent infringement—even when the license
continued to protect the licensee from such an action—the Court in Medtronic
implicitly looked away from the rigor of the well-pleaded complaint rule (or
possibly considered it a merits issue, rather than a jurisdictional one), ignoring the
theories distinction from Christianson and the detailed Grable analysis in favor of
assuming jurisdiction over the case.208 This lesson should not go unheeded in future
patent-license cases.
Finally, a bright-line jurisdictional rule governing patent-license cases will
promote efficiency in patent cases and uniformity in federal licensing law. The
Court in MedImmune described the licensee’s claim that its license “[did] not
require the payment of royalties because the patents do not cover its products and
are invalid” as a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one; the contract dispute, with its
embedded questions of patent law, did not disappear just because the license was
still in effect.209 Likewise, the patent questions that percolate in state-action cases

205. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)
(“[T]here must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising federal
jurisdiction.”).
206. For a description of the Federal Circuit’s origins, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). In this
early work, however, Dreyfuss noted that lingering jurisdictional questions undermined
some of the benefits of the specialized court. Id. at 30–37. Dreyfuss later revisited the
Federal Circuit’s legacy upon its twentieth anniversary as a court. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 769, 787 (2004) (lamenting the Holmes Group decision as “a pity” for “undermining
opportunities for percolation and cross-pollination”).
207. See supra Part I.C.
208. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
209. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135–36 (2007). Justice Thomas
appeared to disagree in his dissent, describing the invalidity claim as a defense that should only
prevent jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 142 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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really are merits questions: Is the patent invalid? Would the licensee be infringing
but for the license? Courts are expending resources to address the jurisdictional
questions before turning to the merits in a way that does not improve the tension
between state and federal courts but only adds to confusion over how to apply the
vague Grable standard.210 As discussed above, Congress clearly has expressed its
intent to keep these cases in federal courts with rights to appeal to the Federal
Circuit, suggesting that a streamlined approach to jurisdiction would be
welcome.211
Importantly, the Federal Circuit, by having jurisdiction over these state contract
cases with embedded patent questions, could further develop its own licensing law
jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit has been described as a “specialized contracts
court,” in the sense that the court handles many contract cases, including many
patent-license cases.212 In these cases, the Federal Circuit has developed a fair
amount of its own law of contracts, stating that such law is necessary to promote
uniformity within the patent system.213 For example, in Group One, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc.,214 the court stated,
[T]he question of whether an invention is the subject of a commercial
offer for sale [as required by 35 U.S.C. § 102] is a matter of Federal
Circuit law, to be analyzed under the law of contracts as generally
understood. To hold otherwise would potentially mean that a patent
could be invalid in one state . . . and valid in a second state, when the
same actions did not amount to an offer under the laws of that second
state. Such a result is clearly incompatible with a uniform national
patent system.215
In fact, one of the main reasons for the formation of the Federal Circuit was to
promote certainty and to “reduce, if not eliminate, the forum-shopping” by parties
to patent litigations.216 Reducing the jurisdictional burden by streamlining the rule
will push the court forward on this goal.

210. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked
Jurisdictional Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011); Kristen Lovin, One
Size Does Not Fit All: Hypothetical Patents and Difficulties with Applying the § 1331
“Substantial Question” Formula to § 1338, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 254, 278–79
(2012); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 122 n.85 (2009).
211. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 5 (2006).
212. Shubha Ghosh, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law
Jurisprudence and IP Federalism 13 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 1247, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390214.
213. See id. at 20–44.
214. 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
215. Id. at 1047.
216. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981).
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B. Disadvantages Considered
A proposal of the nature described in this Article cannot be fully explored
without identifying and managing any inherent disadvantages. One significant
disadvantage to such a rule involves the tension revealed between the parties’
expectation interests in the contract and the strong public policy interest in
encouraging patent challenges as described in Lear.217 The Federal Circuit
implicitly selects the patent policy interests over any state contractual law and
private contractual expectations when it accepts jurisdiction over not only those
cases brought by licensees in good standing post-MedImmune and as approved in
Medtronic but also those cases brought by a patent owner in state court on contract
claims with embedded patent questions. However, this outcome preserves the
Federal Circuit’s power to create a body of federal licensing law separate from state
contract law and dictated by the Federal Circuit’s specialized view of patent law. At
the same time, the patent owner loses his right to shield a presumptively valid
patent from challenges by entering into licenses and pursuing any available
contractual remedies without resorting to infringement litigation, where any
invalidity claim would carry preclusive effect. Perhaps the interests of the patent
owner to choose his forum should carry more weight than they have so far in the
Supreme Court. However, the Lear, Blonder-Tongue, and MedImmune cases may
be read to strongly favor patent challenges over the patent owner’s choice of state
forum and, in fact, over state contract law in general.
One wonders whether a licensee might prefer to litigate the questions of validity
as a defense to a license but without the in rem finality of the determination, as that
helps all licensees, not just the licensee litigating in state court. Again, the choice of
clear rules to encourage patent challenges may outweigh any costs related to
removing the patent owner’s ability to bring a state-court action without exposing
the weaknesses of his patent. A licensee could bring his own declaratory judgment
action for invalidity or noninfringement, even without repudiating the license. It
does not follow that the jurisdictional rules should work to prevent him from
removing such a state action if he does not bring a counterclaim but instead pleads
invalidity as an affirmative defense or if the contract does not explicitly tie its
obligations to valid patent claims. Some common sense would go a long way in this
area of the law.
Importantly, this proposal also raises significant questions about the proper
balance between state and federal courts in hearing cases.218 The Constitution gives
Congress the power to enact legislation to award exclusive rights to inventors for
limited times,219 and Congress does so in the patent laws. This Article only intends
to describe the complexity of jurisdictional questions that arise out of state contract
actions with embedded patent questions, and it offers that such cases should follow

217. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (recognizing that “the equities of the
licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important public
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part
of the public domain”).
218. By suggesting that patent-license cases should always be brought in federal courts, I
do not mean to minimize the importance of federalism.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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other patent cases into federal courts through § 1338. Decoupling § 1338 from §
1331 would go further to emphasize the special nature of patent-license cases, and
patent cases in general, in a manner that leaves intact the important federalism
issues raised in other types of federal-question cases—and indeed, in other patentquestion cases, like the malpractice complaint at issue in Gunn.220
Further, a blanket rule like the one proposed will not reduce the “preeminence of
the states’ laws” because the Federal Circuit and the district courts hearing these
patent cases, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, must apply state laws to the
contractual issues that they end up hearing in conjunction with these patent
cases.221 As such, even though these license cases will be litigated in federal courts
and appealed to the Federal Circuit, parties will still have the ability to select—via
contract—the state laws they prefer to govern their transactions. Nevertheless, in
some areas important to patent law, funneling these cases to the Federal Circuit and
not leaving the occasional case behind in state court may invite the Federal Circuit
to develop a federal common law of contracts when necessary to provide the
uniformity and consistency that its mission requires.
Along those lines, one recent critic of the Federal Circuit has charged the court
with ignoring the Erie doctrine while developing a federal common law of contract
in certain areas of patent law, resulting in a power grab by the Federal Circuit that
limits innovation and competition.222 Empirically, it may be that innovation and
competition are reduced by Federal Circuit developments in contract law, but such
assessments must also take into account the benefits of uniformity and certainty
that may derive from a common law of contracts developed by the Federal Circuit.
In fact, the Federal Circuit may be accustomed to developing such a federal
common law in the context of government contracts for just this reason.223
Yet one need not be convinced that all patent-license issues at the Federal
Circuit should be the subject of a separately derived federal common law of
contract to accept the fairly uncontroversial position that the Federal Circuit, in
many of these cases, could simply apply state contract law to all of the patentlicense claims that it hears.224 The contribution of this Article is not to provide an
extensive solution to the concerns of federalism, jurisdictional power grabbing, or
the necessity of uniformity in patent law, but to begin a conversation about
dismantling these complex rules and expensive jurisdictional inquiries in favor of
merits-based determinations in federal courts on the licensing issues at stake.225
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225. In fact, Professor Mark Patterson suggests that patent licenses should be the subject
of a body of law separate from contracts, in order to better reflect intellectual-property
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CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional rules that determine whether a license case arises under the
patent laws are cumbersome and expensive for courts and litigants alike. Gunn v.
Minton, a recent patent-malpractice case raising very different concerns than the
ones raised in license cases, will only add to the inconsistency, inefficiency, and
uncertainty that surround this “dark corridor” of federal-question jurisdiction. The
time has come for a new assessment of arising-under jurisdiction in patent cases
that reduces these burdens, promotes uniformity, encourages patent challenges, and
reflects Congress’s intent to carry federal patent questions into federal courts.
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